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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on noteworthy opinions by Georgia appellate
courts between June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2016 relevant to the practice of
construction law and on an important amendment to Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 13-8-2,1 expanding its anti-indemnity provisions.
II. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

A. Additional Insured Claims
The issue of first impression in Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Gay Construction Co. 2 was whether the general contractor's scope of work or its
subcontractor's scope of work should be considered when determining if
standard business risk exclusions apply to the general contractor's firstparty claim as an additional insured against the subcontractor's commercial general liability policy. 3
The general contractor, Gay Construction Company (GCC), contracted
to build an elevated terrace in Piedmont Park. Gunby Construction
(Gunby) subcontracted to pour the concrete for the terrace floor. Dai-Cole
Waterproofing Company, Inc. (Dai-Cole) subcontracted to install a waterproofing membrane and a drainage mat to prevent leakage into the
areas under the terrace. Shortly after completion of the work, water began leaking into those areas. GCC determined the leak was caused by
the improper application of the waterproofing membrane. When GCC
could not get Dai-Cole to address the problem, GCC did so. Specifically,
GCC removed the terrace's top concrete slab and drainage mat, repaired
* Shareholder in the firm of Weissman, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. General Counsel for
Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A., 1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (Supp. 2016).
2. 332 Ga. App. 757, 774 S.E.2d 798 (2015).
3. Id. at 761, 774 S.E.2d at 801.
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and replaced the waterproofing membrane, replaced the top concrete
slab, repaired the underside of the slab, repainted the underside of the
slab to cover water stains, and replaced a light fixture that was damaged
as a result of the water infiltration. As an additional insured under DaiCole's commercial general liability policy, GCC then sued Auto Owners
Insurance Company (Auto Owners) to recover the costs GCC had incurred in performing the work. Auto Owners filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that standard business risk exclusions applied to
all of GCC's work, not just the work performed by Dai-Cole, and therefore none of the claims were covered by the policy. The trial court denied
the motion but granted a certificate of immediate review. 4
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the business risk
exclusions applied to all of GCC's work.5 The court reasoned in part that
to hold otherwise would mean that GCC had greater coverage under the
Auto Owners policy than Dai-Cole and would effectively require Auto
Owners to financially guarantee Dai-Cole's work.6
B. Mold Claim Exclusions
Dolan v. Auto Insurance Co.7 involved a declaratory judgment action
filed by a commercial general liability insurer for a determination of coverage for claims by homeowners allegedly arising out of the negligent replacement by the insured contractor of duct work for an air conditioning
unit.8 The insurer contended that the homeowners' claims for property
damage were barred by an exclusion for property damage to "[t]hat particular part of real property on which any insured or any contractors or
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the 'property damage' arises out of those operations . . . ."@ The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant

of summary judgment on this ground, reasoning that this exclusion, with
its present tense language "are performing," applied only to work being
performed and not to the contractor's work that had already been completed.10
The trial court's grant of summary judgment was also based on an exclusion for property damage to "[t]hat particular part of any property that

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 757-59, 774 S.E.2d at 798-800.
Id. at 762, 774 S.E.2d at 801-02.
Id. at 762, 774 S.E.2d at 801.
333 Ga. App. 601, 773 S.E.2d 789 (2015).
Id. at 601, 773 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 602, 773 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 604-05, 773 S.E.2d at 792.
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must be restored, repaired or replaced because 'your work' was incorrectly performed on it."11 The policy expressly stated, however, "this exclusion does not apply to 'property damage' included in the 'productscompleted operation hazard,"' 12 which the policy defined "as property
damage or bodily injury occurring away from property owned by [the contractor] and 'arising out of .

.

. [the contractor's] work .

.

. when all the

13

work to be done at the job site has been completed."' On appeal, the
court reversed, holding that because the record established all of the contractor's work had been completed prior to the damage, the work fell
within the products-completed operation hazard exception to this exclusion. 14
On appeal, the homeowners also argued the trial court erred in ruling
the "Fungi Endorsement" excluded coverage for their claims for bodily
injury because that endorsement did not apply to claims falling within
the products-completed operations aggregate. The court disagreed, rea15
soning that such claims did fall within the aggregate.
C. Notice to Excess Insurer
PlantationPipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Insurance Co.16 is a helpful reminder of the importance of promptly notifying excess insurers of potential claims and maintaining a complete record of insurance policies. The
"occurrence" at issue took place in 1976, when it was discovered that fuel
had leaked from a Plantation Pipe Line Company (Plantation) pipeline.
Plantation immediately repaired the pipeline. About thirty years later,
in April 2007, Plantation discovered contaminated soil, which was traced
to the April 1976 leak.17 Three years later, Plantation sent written notice
to Stonewall Insurance Company (Stonewall) that its excess policy would
likely be implicated by third-party claims arising from the contamination
discovered in April 2007. Stonewall responded that Plantation's notice
was not prompt as required by its policy and denied coverage. Plantation
then filed suit against Stonewall. The trial court granted Stonewall's motion for summary judgment based on its notice defense, and it denied
Plantation's motion for summary judgment on that defense. 18

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 602, 773 S.E.2d at 791.
Id.
Id. at 603, 773 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 605, 773 S.E.2d at 793.
Id. at 603, 773 S.E.2d at 791.
335 Ga. App. 302, 780 S.E.2d 501 (2015).
Id. at 303, 780 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 302-03, 780 S.E.2d at 504.
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On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals referenced a notice provision
of the Stonewall policy that stated in part: "When an occurrence takes
place which, in the opinion of the insured, involves or may involve liability on the part of the company, prompt written notice shall be given by
or on behalf of the insured to the company or its authorized agents. . . ."19
Under terms like this, the court reasoned, the insured's notice obligations
are not triggered by the underlying occurrence, but rather by the insured's assessment of the likelihood that its.liability will exceed the primary policy or lower tier excess coverage. 20 The court held that Plantation failed, as a matter .of law, to provide prompt notice as required by
the policy, because it did not provide notice to Stonewall until more than
two years after Plantation had determined that its liability would likely
exceed its underlying coverages. 21
Plantation further contended that, even if its notice was untimely, it
did not eliminate coverage under the Stonewall policy, because the policy
did not expressly state that prompt notice was a condition precedent to
coverage, and Stonewall was not prejudiced by the delay in notice. 22 Before addressing those specific arguments, the court noted several principles of Georgia law relating to late notice. 23 First, when possible, an insurance policy is construed to avoid forfeitures and to provide coverage. 24
Second, a notice provision that expressly states timely notice is a condition precedent to coverage is enforceable absent a showing of justification
for late notice, and the insurer is not required to show actual harm from
a delay in order to deny coverage. 25 Third, conversely, if timely notice is
not an express condition precedent to coverage, untimely notice forfeits
coverage only if the insurer demonstrates prejudice. 26
The court held that, because the Stonewall policy notice provision did
not expressly make compliance with that provision a condition precedent
to coverage, the trial court erred in concluding that Stonewall was not
required to show prejudice in order to deny coverage. 27 The court further
held Stonewall's bare assertion that Plantation's untimely notice deprived Stonewall of an opportunity to investigate was insufficient to
carry its burden on summary judgment of showing prejudice as a matter

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 303-04, 780 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 306-07, 780 S.E.2d at 506-07.
Id. at 308-09, 780 S.E.2d at 507-08.
Id. at 310, 780 S.E.2d at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 311, 780 S.E.2d at 509-10.
Id. at 311, 780 S.E.2d at 510.
Id. at 313, 780 S.E.2d at 511.

2016]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

87

of law. 28 Based on the foregoing, the court concluded the trial court
properly denied Plantation's motion for summary judgment but erred in
granting Stonewall's motion for summary judgment. 29
III. GEORGIA'S FALSE CLAIM ACT

Under certain circumstances, Georgia's Taxpayer Protection False
Claim Act (Act)30 allows a lawsuit to be brought by the state, local governments, and private persons against a person who made a false claim
for money or property relating to certain state and local matters.3 1 These
claims can be made against public project contractors and subcontractors. The Act also includes the following anti-retaliation provision:
Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the
terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the
employee, contractor, agent, or associated others in furtherance of a
civil action under this Code section or other efforts to stop one or more
32
violations of this article.

The issue in McKinney v. Fuciarelli33 was whether a tenured faculty
member at Valdosta State University, who claimed to have been demoted
and who asserted a claim under this anti-retaliation provision, was required by the Act to obtain the Georgia Attorney General's approval to
pursue that claim. 34 The Georgia Supreme Court held that such approval
35
was required by the clear wording of the Act.
IV. ARBITRATION

A. Motion to Vacate ArbitrationAward
In Atlanta FlooringDesign Centers, Inc. v. R. G. Williams Construction,
Inc., 36 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a subcontract provision stating: "Contractor and Subcontractor hereby expressly

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 314, 780 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
O.C.G.A. tit. 23 ch. 3 art. 6 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. § 23-3-122 (2014 & Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. § 23-3-122(1)(1).
298 Ga. 873, 785 S.E.2d 861 (2016).
Id. at 873, 785 S.E.2d at 861-62.
Id.
333 Ga. App. 528, 773 S.E.2d 868 (2015).
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agree not to challenge the validity of the arbitration or the award." 37 After an arbitration award was issued, the subcontractor filed a motion in
court seeking to vacate the award under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(a),38 in the
Georgia Arbitration Act, alleging its rights were prejudiced in the arbitration on grounds set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b).39 The trial court dismissed the motion to vacate because of the subcontract provision quoted
above. 40 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the subcontract provision "conflicts with and frustrates Georgia public policy as expressed in
the [Georgia Arbitration Code,]" and is therefore unenforceable.41
B. Offer of Judgment in Arbitration Context
InAlessi v. CornerstoneAssociates, Inc., 42 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed whether Georgia's offer-of-judgment statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-1168,43 applies to an arbitration award. 44 Under that statute, a defendant
may recover attorney fees and expenses incurred by or on his or her behalf after the rejection of a settlement offer by or on his or her behalf if
the final judgment is no liability or is less than 75% of the settlement
offer.4 5 Following the homeowner claimants' rejection of a $3,000 settlement offer from the builder respondent, the arbitrator issued an award
that granted no money to the homeowners. 46 The builder then filed a motion in court to confirm the arbitration award and a request in court under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 for $67,268.41 in attorney fees and expenses incurred in the arbitration. 47 The trial court granted the motion and
request under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68.48 The court of appeals reversed, holding that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 does not apply to arbitration proceedings. 49
According to the court, the fact that an arbitration award can be confirmed in court does not make it part of the judicial process.5 0

37.
38.
39.
S.E.2d
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 528, 773 S.E.2d at 869.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(a) (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) (2015); Atlanta FlooringDesign Ctrs., 333 Ga. App. at 528, 773
at 869.
Atlanta FlooringDesign Ctrs., 333 Ga. App. at 528, 773 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 530, 773 S.E.2d at 870.
334 Ga. App. 490, 780 S.E.2d 15 (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2015).
Alessi, 334 Ga. App. at 492, 780 S.E.2d at 16.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68.
Alessi, 334 Ga. App. at 491, 780 S.E.2d at 16.
Id. at 492, 780 S.E.2d at 16.
Id.
Id. at 495, 780 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id. at 494, 780 S.E.2d at 18.
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V. PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE BONDS

A. Bad FaithPenalties
51
A key issue in Choate Construction Co. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.
was whether Auto-Owners Insurance Company, the surety on payment
52
and performance bonds, was liable under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a) for bad
faith penalties for denial of Choate Construction Company's claim as the
obligee under the bonds.5 3 O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a) states in relevant part:

In the event of a loss which is covered by a policy of insurance and the
refusal of the insurer to pay the same within 60 days after a demand
has been made by the holder of the policy and a finding has been made
that such refusal was in bad faith, the insurer shall be liable to pay
such holder, in addition to the loss, not more than 50 percent of the
liability of the insurer for the loss or $5,000.00, whichever is greater,
and all reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action
against the insurer. 54
Because the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded the surety had reasonable grounds to contest if the bonds had been issued to the defaulting
subcontractor, as opposed to another entity, it held that the surety was
not liable under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a).56
B. Lack of Payment Bond

In City of College Park v. Sekisui SPR Americas, LLC,56 the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
on claims by a subcontractor against a city for amounts not being paid by
57
the general contractor on a city project. The subcontractor argued in
part that the City of College Park (the City) was liable under O.C.G.A. §
36-91-9158 because the City had not obtained a required payment bond
or other substitute security. Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals
rejected the subcontractor's argument because the project was an emergency, which is an exception to the City's liability under O.C.G.A. § 3691-91.59 The subcontractor also asserted unjust enrichment, quantum

51. 335 Ga. App. 331, 779 S.E.2d 465 (2015).
52. O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a) (2014 & Supp. 2016).
53. Choate Constr. Co., 335 Ga. App. at 340, 779 S.E.2d at 471-72.

54. O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Choate Constr. Co., 335 Ga. App. at 340, 779 S.E.2d at 472.
331 Ga. App. 404, 771 S.E.2d 101 (2015).
Id. at 404-05, 771 S.E.2d at 102.
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91 (2012).
College Park, 331 Ga. App. at 408-09, 771 S.E.2d at 104-05.
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meruit, and implied obligation to pay claims against the City for the unpaid amounts. The City contended these claims were barred by the subcontractor's failure to give ante litem notice to the City under O.C.G.A. §
36-33-5.60 The court held that such notice was not required because
O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 plainly applies only to tort claims regarding personal
injury or property damage.61 The court nevertheless affirmed the grant
of summary judgment in the City's favor on the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and implied obligation to pay claims, because it agreed with
the City's contention that O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91 provided the sole possible
remedy for the subcontractor against the City.62
VI. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION

Although Hines v. Holland6 3 was not a construction case, it addressed

contribution and indemnification claims, which are important in construction disputes. In Hines, a title insurer sued a closing attorney for
professional negligence for failing to list an unsatisfied security deed of

record on a title policy. The closing attorney, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against the title examiner who had failed to list the security
deed on the title report to the closing attorney. The trial court dismissed
the third-party complaint on the basis that the closing attorney could not
seek indemnity or contribution from the title examiner.6 4

On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that a third-party complaint under O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-1465 must be based on secondary or deriva-

tive liability. Typically, the court explained, this means the third-party
complaint must be based on indemnity, subrogation, contribution or warranty.6 6 The court held the closing attorney could not assert a contribution claim because the right to contribution relates only to joint tortfeasors, and the closing attorney had specifically denied that the title
examiner was a joint tortfeasor. 67
Before commenting on the closing attorney's indemnity claims, the

court stated that Georgia law recognizes two categories of indemnity.
One is contract indemnity, and the other is vicarious liability based on
the imputation of liability to a principal for acts of an agent. 68 The court
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (2012 & Supp. 2016).
College Park, 331 Ga. App. at 406-08, 771 S.E.2d at 103-04.
Id. at 409-10, 771 S.E.2d at 105.
334 Ga. App. 292, 779 S.E.2d 63 (2015).
Id. at 292-93, 779 S.E.2d at 65-66.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-14 (Supp. 2016).
Hines, 334 Ga. App. at 294-95, 779 S.E.2d at 66-67.
Id. at 295-96, 779 S.E.2d at 67-68.
Id. at 295, 779 S.E.2d at 67.
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then held that the closing attorney was not alleging he was vicariously
liable for the acts of the title examiner, but instead that the title examiner's negligence caused him to be professionally negligent.6 9 The court
added that under Georgia law, only an attorney is authorized to render
legal opinions as to the status of the title to realty.70 Thus, the closing
attorney was directly, rather than vicariously, liable.71
VII.ANTI-INDEMNITY PROVISIONS IN O.C.G.A.

§ 13-8-2

72

For many years, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) has outlawed provisions in contracts relative to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a
building structure, appurtenances, and appliances that purport to require one contracting party to indemnify, hold harmless, insure or defend
another of the contracting parties or other named indemnitee against liability for damage, loss, or expense arising out of bodily injury, death, or
damage to property that was caused by the sole negligence of the indemnitee (the one benefitting from the indemnity), or its officers, agents, or
employees. 73
In 2016, the Georgia Legislature added subparagraph (c) to O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-2.74 It applies to contracts for engineering, architectural, and land
surveying services, and it generally mirrors the indemnity restrictions in
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). 75 However, it differs from O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) in
three ways. First, it is not limited to bodily injury, death, and property
damage. Second, it does not expressly apply only to damage caused by
the sole negligence of the indemnitee, or its officers, agents, or employees.
Third, it does not apply to damages, losses, or expenses to the extent
caused by or resulting from the negligence, recklessness, or intentionally
wrongful conduct of the indemnitor or other persons employed or utilized
by the indemnitor in the performance of the contract.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 296, 779 S.E.2d at 67-68.
Id. at 296-97, 779 S.E.2d at 68.
Id. at 297, 779 S.E.2d at 68.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (2010 & Supp. 2016).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(c) (Supp. 2016) (enacted by Ga. H.R. Bill 943, Reg. Sess. (2016)).
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b).
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